A Critical Guide to Marbury V. Madison by Van Alstyne, William W.
SDuke 1AI" 3fouarn
VOLUME 1969 JANUARY NuMBER 1
A CRITICAL GUIDE TO MARBURY
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WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
The concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of state
and federal statutes by the Supreme Court is generally rested
upon the epic decision in Marbury v. Madison. The
controversies which have surrounded the exercise of this power
by the Supreme Court require a periodic reexamination of the
concept of judicial review at its source, the Marbury opinion.
This article proceeds by examining the historical context in
which the case arose and analyzes the opinion in terms of
various alternative approaches which might have been utilized
by Chief Justice Marshall. The specific holding of the case is
isolated in contrast to later interpretation given it, and a
collection of relevant historical materials is presented to lend
insight into the constitutional viewpoints of the period.
INTRODUCTION
THE DECISION in Marbury v. Madison' was written under seem-
ingly inauspicious circumstances. Its author, John Marshall,
the fourth Chief Justice of the United States, had come to the
Supreme Court without prior judicial experience and had served on
the Court a scant three years before rendering this decision.
Marshall was appointed to the post from the President's cabinet as a
second choice in the aftermath of a national election in which the
President and his party had been deposed. The decision itself partly
turned upon facts of which the Chief Justice had personal knowledge
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because of his previous involvement in the controversy while serving
as Secretary of State. Though he wrote for a unanimous Court in
Marbury v. Madison, he was widely criticized to the point of
concern lest he be impeached-as was one of his colleagues during
these early years when the Court was a most fragile institution.
Yet, the judgment of history has been far more kind to John
Marshall than were many of his contemporaries, and today he is
overwhelmingly regarded as the greatest judicial figure to have
graced the Supreme Court of the United States. Of all his significant
contributions to our constitutional history, none has been more
acclaimed or seems more secure as enduring precedent than his
decision in Marbury v. Madison.
The unique significance of Marshall's opinion in Marbury is
thought to be memorialized in the following language of a more
contemporary, but equally unanimous, Supreme Court:
This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system.'
Or as Mr. Justice Jackson put it, addressing himself to the finality
of the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution as upheld in
Marbury: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final." 3 Marbury presumably is also
the authoritative basis of the following remark by Charles Evans
Hughes (later Chief Justice of the United States) so incautiously
phrased as to jar democratic sensibilities: "We are under a
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is. .
Practically every era in which the Court subsequently employed
its power of constitutional review to invalidate popular legislation
produced new critics and scholars who subjected Marshall's
opinion in Marbury to searching reexamination. There is, as a
consequence, a far greater abundance of published scholarly
criticism of the case than students of constitutional law can hope to
pull together within the little time available even in the best law
-Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
'Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of ('ominerce, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 133,
139 (1908).
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school courses. Everything else in the course inevitably turns back to
this early case, since everything else is examined in the context of
other cases wherein the Court exercised its power of constitutional
review; yet the materials are least available here, at the beginning,
where they might be most helpful.
I have, therefore, thought it useful to try to put together in this
one place a reasonably comprehensive and critical guide to Marbury
v. Madison, frankly acknowledging that this guide is largely a
compendium of others' work. The article proceeds in five parts:
I. A Description of the Context of the Case.
II. An Analysis of the Opinion.
Ill. A Specification of the Holding Respecting Constitutional
Review.
IV. Some Supplementary Materials Respecting the Legitimacy of
National Substantive Constitutional Review.
V. A Selected Bibliography, exclusive of cases.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE
On January 20, 1801, President John Adams offered the name of
John Marshall for approval by the Senate as the fourth Chief Justice
of the United States. The President's action followed the resignation
of Oliver Ellsworth (who resigned as the third Chief Justice for
reasons of health), and an unsuccessful overture to John Jay (the
first Chief Justice) who declined the President's appointment on
grounds of age and the necessity of sitting on the circuit courts.
Marshall was forty-five years old, with twelve years practice but no
prior judicial experience, and he was serving as Adams' secretary of
state at the time of his appointment to the Court. The Senate
approved the appointment and Marshall took the oath of office on
February 4, 1801. A strong Federalist, Marshall was already at
political odds with Thomas Jefferson who was about to take office
as President, and his relationship with Jefferson became more
antagonistic as subsequent events began to unfold.
In the presidential election of 1800, Jefferson had received a
popular majority over Adams, but Federalist strength among the
electors resulted in an electoral-vote tie between Jefferson and Aaron
Burr. The election was therefore committed to the House of
Representatives. Before the House acted on the presidency, however,
the Federalist holdover Congress took a number of actions in an
effort to preserve vestiges of party influence during the next
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administration. Two of these actions had a direct bearing on the
federal judiciary.
On February 13, 1801, just nine days after Marshall took office
as Chief Justice and four days before Jefferson was declared
president by the House, the Federalist Congress adopted the Circuit
Courts Act. 5 This act altered the federal judiciary by relieving
Supreme Court Justices of circuit duty, reducing the number of
Supreme Court Justices from six to five (reportedly to keep Jefferson
from appointing a replacement for Mr. Justice Cushing who was ill),
and establishing six new circuit courts with sixteen judges all of
whom were to be appointed by Adams and quickly approved by
Congress before Jefferson took office. On March 2, 1801, two days
before the government passed to Jefferson and the Republicans,
Senate confirmation of all judicial posts was completed. Virtually all
of the appointees were Federalists.
The Circuit Court Act itself, however, was not the immediate
source of the legal issue subsequently reviewed in Marbury'v.
Madison. Rather, that issue arose from still another post-election
Federalist effort to secure control of certain offices during the
anticipated Jefferson administration. Pursuant to an act passed on
February 27, 1801,6 Adams appointed forty-two justices of the peace
for the District of Columbia and Alexandria, each to serve for a five-
year term as provided by the Act itself. These appointees were all
confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1801, just one day before the
national government changed hands. The commissions for these
posts were made out in John Marshall's office, as Marshall was still
serving as holdover Secretary of State although he had also been
Chief Justice for nearly a month, but by midnight of March 3, at
least four commissions had not yet been delivered.
Immediately upon assuming office, Jefferson ordered his new
Secretary of State, James Madison, to hold up all commissions
which had not yet been delivered. One of these was that of William
Marbury.
On December 21, 1801, Marbury filed suit in the Supreme Court
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Madison to deliver his
commission which, he claimed, Madison had no right to withhold.
Marbury was represented by Charles Lee who had seived as
'Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4. 2 Stat. 89.
' Act of February 27, 1801. ch. 15, § I I. 2 Stat. 107.
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Attorney General under Adams. Madison received notice, but
declined to acknowledge the propriety of the suit even by appearing
through counsel. The order to show cause was issued by the Court
and the case was set down for argument on the law for the next term.
Thus the stage was already set for several important and politically
incendiary issues: (1) Was the Secretary of State answerable in
court for the conduct of his office? (2) Could the Court
countermand a presidential decision respecting subordinate
appointments? (3) By what means could any such judicial decision
possibly be enforced?
The issue of judicial review came to independent prominence the
next year, in 1802, while Marbury's case was still pending, when the
Republican Congress debated its own authority to repeal the Circuit
Courts Act. There was some apprehension that the Federalist-
dominated Supreme Court might presume to declare the proposed
act of repeal unconstitutional.'
Early in 1802, however, the new Congress overcame its doubts
respecting its own authority and that of the Court, and repealed the
Circuit Courts Act.' To gain time to strengthen Republican control
of the national government, Congress also eliminated part of the
1802 Term of the Supreme Court, thus postponing a test of the
Repeal Act's constitutionality, of judicial review itself, and of
Marbury's case as well. All three matters awaited the Court's
determination in 1803.1
In any case, the critical events immediately staging Marbury's
case were all telescoped into a single month, in early 1801:
February 4, 1801: Appointed by Adams, Marshall takes office
as Chief Justice while continuing to serve as
Secretary of State.
The issue involved in the proposed repeal of the Circuit Courts Act was whether
elimination of the newly established courts would be deemed a violation of section one of
Article III which subjects federal judges to removal only by impeachment, and whether the act
of repeal might be deemed to violate the concept of separation of powers arguably implicit in
the plan of Articles 1. 11. and Ill.
"Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
Six days after the decision in Marbury v. Madison the Court decided Stuart v. Laird, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803), upholding the Republican Repeal Act. Indeed, after Marbury.
fifty-four years were to pass before the Supreme Court again held an act of Congress to be
unconstitutional. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). As of today,
moreover, scarcely more than a hundred of the many thousands of federal statutes adopted by
Congress have been held unconstitutional.
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Federalist Congress adopts the Circuit Courts
Act establishing six new circuit courts with
sixteen judges, and reduces the Supreme
Court to five Justices.
Presidential electoral deadlock from 1800 is
broken by the House in favor of Jefferson.
Federalist Congress adopts Act authorizing
Adams to appoint 42 Justices of the Peace for
five-year terms.
Senate confirmation of new circuit court
appointees completed.
Senate confirmation of the Justices of the
Peace completed, but several commissions
still undelivered at midnight.
Jefferson takes office and Madison is
instructed to withhold the undelivered
commissions.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The First Issue
Rather than writing about the opinion in general, we may more
successfully deal with it in the manner in which one is in fact
expected to analyze cases-by taking them on their own terms,
raising and resolving questions each step of the way. Thus, it seems
logical to begin with the Court's own beginning.
The Court declares that the "first" issue presented by the case is:
"Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?" At least
two criticisms of this beginning have been made. Both arise in
answer to the question: Was Marbury's entitlement to the
commission he demanded really the issue which the Court should
have examined first? Arguably, it was not.
Surely the Court ought first determine whether it has any
authority to decide any issues whatever respecting the merits of the
case, i.e., it should first resolve the preliminary question of its own
jurisdiction. The Court's jurisdiction was ostensibly based on section
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which Marbury alleged to empower
the Court to issue a writ of mandamus in this sort of case. But if the
Act did not in fact provide for such jurisdiction, or if it were invalid
in attempting to provide for such jurisdiction, the Court, would be
[Vol. 1969: 1
MARBUR Y v. MADISON
without proper authority to consider the merits of Marbury's claim.
Thus, it may be said, the "first" issue was solely the question of the
Court's jurisdiction and it should have spoken to that issue at the
beginning. The logic of such an approach was subsequently well
stated in Ex parte McCardle:I°
Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the
fact and dismissing the cause."
Additionally, such a course would be better adapted to avoid a
"peculiar delicacy" of the case which Marshall himself recognized
was present in passing upon the amenability of a cabinet officer to
suit, especially under circumstances which might reflect adversely
upon that officer and the President of the United States. If the Court
determined that it had no jurisdiction, it would have no occasion to
reach the matter of "peculiar delicacy." It was therefore improper
for Marshall to begin as he did.
Perhaps it can be said, however, that this second criticism is not
well taken by itself since the amenability of a cabinet officer to suit
was not of course the only issue of "peculiar delicacy." Of at least
equal delicacy was the question of the Court's relationship to
Congress, i.e., its capacity to second guess the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. Since the Court might avoid the necessity of
confronting the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act by disposing of
the case on other grounds (assuming that it were to find Marbury
not entitled to his commission), it should seek to do so where
possible, as here. Such a course, to avoid passing upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress where decision is possible on
other grounds, was especially well defended in a later era by Mr.
Justice Brandeis.'" Under this view, perhaps Marshall cannot be
faulted for postponing consideration of judicial review and the
constitutionality of the Judiciary Act until he had first exhausted
other possible bases for disposing of the case.
Even the first criticism, that the Court must logically deal first
with the threshhold question of its jurisdiction to hear the case, may
also be used to show that it was not necessarily inappropriate for the
Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 wall.) 506 (1869).
"Id. at 514.
'2See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1936).
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Court to consider Marbury's entitlement to the commission as the
"first" issue. For it is arguable that that issue partly depends upon
whether, under the circumstances, Madison is answerable in court
for the conduct of his office as Secretary of State, i.e., whether he is
subject to the Court's jurisdiction in an action brought against him
in his official capacity. Thus, in one sense, the Court did begin with
an issue respecting "jurisdiction."
Ultimately, we may reach a stalemate on this point. There may
scarcely be any way the Court can begin without necessarily deciding
something associated with jurisdiction and without implicitly
deciding some constitutional issue. To be sure, the validity of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the authority of the Court to determine
that validity, pose a grave constitutional question-but then so does
the amenability of a cabinet officer to answer in a court of law. On
the other hand, to begin with a treatment of Marbury's claim
against Madison cannot be justified on the grounds that this
approach may more nearly respect the separation of powers by
avoiding the necessity of passing upon the constitutionality of an act
of Congress, since it will itself involve the necessity of deciding the
extent to which a cabinet officer is or is not constitutionally immune
from suit.
Finally, however, there is clearly an "issue" of sorts which
preceded any of those touched upon in the opinion. Specifically, it
would appear that Marshall should have recused himself in view of
his substantial involvement in the background of this controversy.
Remember, too, that the Court thought it important to establish
whether Marbury's commission had already been signed and'sealed
before it was withdrawn-to determine whether Marbury's interest
had "vested" and whether Madison was refusing to carry out a
merely ministerial duty, or whether the commission was sufficiently
incomplete that matters of executive discretion were involved. Proof
of the status of Marbury's commission not only involved
circumstances within the Chief Justice's personal knowledge, it was
furnished in the Supreme Court by Marshall's own younger brother
who had been with him in his office when, as Secretary of State, he
had made out the commissions. Arguably the first issue, then, was
the appropriateness of Marshall's participation in the decision.13
" Assuming that a lower court decision today might be reversed for failure of the presiding
judge to have recused himself under such circumstances, it is not clear what relief, if any,
would be available against such an indiscretion at the level of the Supreme Court.
[Vol. 1969: 1
MARBUR Y v. MADISON
Marbury's "Right" to the Commission
On the basis of the Act of 180 14 providing for the appointment
of justices of the peace for a five-year term plus findings of fact that
the appointment had "vested," the Court held that Marbury had a
"right" to the commission. The Act itself was based on the power of
Congress granted by the Constitution in Article I, section 8, clause
17, "to exercise Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over" the
District of Columbia. Marshall concludes that once the commission
had been signed and sealed by President Adams, Marbury's claim to
the office was complete.
Marshall reasonably could have concluded, however, that no
interest actually "vested" in Marbury prior to actual delivery of the
commission. Jefferson evidently thought that the better conclusion,
subsequently insisting that Marshall's decision on this point was a
"perversion of law," and maintaining that "if there is any principle
of law never yet contradicted, it is that delivery is one of the
essentials to the validity of the deed."'" Even if Jefferson overstated
the law, and even assuming authority could be found urging that
certain interests "vest" prior to delivery, it would not necessarily be
dispositive of this case. The Court is reviewing an aspect of executive
power and passing judgment upon the propriety of conduct by a co-
ordinate branch of government here, a consideration not present in
an ordinary civil suit between private litigants. Then, too, it is
arguable that there is no comparable need in this kind of case to
locate the point of "vesting" in a fairly mechanical fashion as in real
property transactions where one may need a more rigid rule to
facilitate planning, personal security, and reasonable reliance. Indeed
the Court did not advert to any evidence that Marbury had in fact
detrimentally relied upon the commission after it was signed and
sealed, but before he had notice of its withdrawal.
Marshall observed not only that the appointment had proceeded
so far that Marbury's right had "vested," but that the office was
"for five years, independent of the executive," and "not revocable."
Presumably Marshall reasoned that (1) failure to deliver the
commission might otherwise be taken as implied revocation by
Jefferson, and (2) if the commission is revocable without cause, from
" Act of February 27, 1801. ch. 15, § 1I. 2 Stat. 107.
" Letter from Jefferson to William Johnson, June, 1823, in S. PADOVER. THE GENIUS OF
AMERICA 130 (1960).
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moment to moment, Marbury may be unable to show any injury.
With this additional "finding" Marshall decided a significant
constitutional issue, one which the Supreme Court has substantially
modified. The issue is whether Congress can prescribe the term of
office and limit the conditions for the removal of subordinate federal
officers, or whether such attempts violate the separation of powers
and infringe upon the executive's implied removal power that
accompanies his power to appoint and his power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed, as well as his broad power as Chief
Executive. It is clear that Marbury was not appointed as an Article
III judge (since his term in office was limited), and it is arguable that
he was more of a "legislative" subordinate than an "executive"
subordinate. In the few cases where the executive's removal power
has been successfully challenged, moreover, the only remedy ever
granted was a judgment for salary. Restoration to the office itself
apparently has never been granted to an official removed by the
President. 6
A Right-A Remedy
The Court declares that the second issue is, assuming that
Marbury "has a right [to the commission], and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?"' 7 The first
,1 In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Chief Justice Taft expressly disapproved
this part of Marbury in holding that a requirement for senatorial approval of the President's
removal of second class postmasters (whose term by statute was unlimited) was
unconstitutional under Article 1I, sections I through 3, and primarily under section 2, clause 2,
the appointment power. In Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 701 (1941). executive removal of a TVA director contrary to statutory provision by
Congress was sustained on the same basis. Compare Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935), upholding the power of Congress to limit the President's power to
remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission "for cause" where the appointment was
for seven years, and awarding salary to a Commissioner removed by President Roosevelt
without cause; and Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), a similar holding respecting
a War Claims Commissioner under appointment for a three-year term who was awarded back
salary after removal by Eisenhower contrary to statutory provision. The issue generally turns
on (I) the character of the office in question, i.e.. whether it is primarily "executive,"
"legislative," or "judicial" in function; (2) specificity of the congressional power pursuant to
which the office was established; and (3) length of term of the appointment. For an excellent
review of Humphrey's Executor with a fresh discussion of this issue, see Leuehtenberg, The
Case of The Contentious Commissioner: Humphrey's Executor v. U.S.. FREEDOM AND
REFORM 276-312 (Hyman & Levy, eds., 1967).
'" When Marshall asks if the laws of this country afford Marbury a remedy, one might
observe that Marshall is deciding implicitly still another significant issue of constitutional law
even before examining the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed on the merits.
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step in the argument seems gentle but compelling: "The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."
The declaration is a kind of self-evident matter: ubi ius, ibi
remedium. More than that, it is a prophetic definition of "legal
right" itself, anticipating Holmes' statement by a hundred years-
"For legal purposes, a right is only the hypostasis of a
prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that
the public force will be brought to bear upon those who are said to
contravene it. . .." 18
Necessarily, however, Marshall is deciding the extent to which
sovereign immunity plus the concept of separation of powers does
and does not immunize ranking cabinet officers from suit and from
liability in the federal courts, even when the cabinet officer is
acting pursuant to direction by the President. Indeed this was
regarded at the time as the more critical issue, with Jefferson taking
the position that the Court had no authority thus to examine the
exercise of executive prerogatives. It is clear, moreover, that
Marshall himself is not prepared to go the full distance since his
opinion indicates that there are discretionary decisions and political
questions for the executive which are not reviewable in the courts
even assuming that they adversely affect private interests. 9
Marshall explicitly qualifies his statement that one may claim
redress in the courts whenever he receives an injury. In doing so, he
anticipates problems still not clearly resolved. One of these concerns
the matter of "political questions."
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or
confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear
than that their acts are only politically examinable,
i.e., not subject to judicial review but subject only to electoral review
and perhaps to congressional pressure. Here it could be contended
that Madison was acting "merely to execute the will of the
president," but Marshall rejected that view in favor of two more
"Holmes, Natural Law. 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918).
"Had Marbury sued for his salary, rather than delivery of his commission, and had be
brought his action against the United States as such, he could not recover without a waiver of
sovereign immunity (as provided in the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Urgent Deficiencies Act,
etc.) even today.
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limited tests: (1) "cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional . . . discretion," and (2) "cases in which the executive
possesses. . . a legal discretion."
"Constitutional discretion" might, for instance, involve the
exercise of the "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment" under
Article II, section 2, clause one,20 or the veto power in Article I,
section 7, clauses 2 and 3. Arguably, the Constitution itself precludes
judicial review of the grounds of presidential exercise of these
powers. Presumably, "legal discretion" would cover a situation
where a statute authorizing the executive to act left the occasion and
character of the act to his discretion.
21
Marshall's discussion of this matter carries through his
treatment of the next item as well and the indefiniteness of the
opinion is bound to generate problems in the future.22 Thus Marshall
says: "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion." (Query: Is it always
possible to do the first without necessarily doing the second as well?)
"Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court." (Emphasis added.) Note that here "political questions" are
judicially unreviewable and are separate from still other questions
explicitly made unreviewable by the Constitution or laws. Thus some
questions not made judicially unreviewable by the Constitution itself
are nonetheless judicially unreviewable because they are "in their
nature political." What does that mean? How shall it be reconciled
with statements appearing later in this case: e.g., "The judicial power
of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the
Constitution." (Emphasis added.) "Could it be the intention of those
who gave this power, to say that in using it the Constitution should
not be looked into? That a case arising under the Constitution should
"'See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
2 The -concept of 'legal discretion" would seem to apply to Marbury's case at a slightly
earlier step, when Adams had submitted Marbury's name for the post, the Senate had
approved, but the commission had not actually been signed and sealed before Jefferson took
office. This point is very close to the one made earlier in trying to determine precisely when it
was that Marbury's "right" "vested."
22See, e.g., Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I
(1849). See Mr. Justice Brennan's discussion of "justiciability" in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
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be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases, then, the
Constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open
it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey?"
(Emphasis added.) Here, then, is another seminal issue generated by
Marbury v. Madison: Assuming that all the requisites of a "case" are
present in the limited sense required by Article III, assuming also
that judicial relief or remedy is sought for a palpable injury allegedly
resulting from an executive action in violation of the Constitution,
and assuming finally that the resolution of the constitutional issue is
not reserved by the Constitution itself to executive interpretation,
how can the Court refuse to consider the constitutional issue thus
presented on the basis that the question is "political" in nature? In
such a situation, what meaning is left to the determination that a
citizen has a "right," if the Court determines that "the laws of his
country [do not] afford him a remedy?""-
Appropriateness of Mandamus
The next question is whether Marbury "is entitled to the remedy
for which he applies," in the narrow sense of whether common-law
usage makes mandamus appropriate. As thus narrowed, there may
be less controversy over Marshall's treatment of the point.24 The writ
is a "legal" one but extraordinary in character and issuing only
when other legal remedies are inadequate and only then to compel
the doing of a specific act ministerial and nondiscretionary in
character, clearly required by law, and easily supervised by the court.
Simple delivery of the sealed commission to Marbury in the
circumstances of this case seems to meet these common law tests and
the Judiciary Act of 1789 states that the writ is to issue "in cases
warranted by the principles and usages of law, to . . . persons
holding office under the authority of the United States."
11Cf Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). For a recent illustration, see Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). For three of the most provocative discussions of this
problem, see Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1963); Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the 'Pasiive Virtues'-A Comment on Principles and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law. 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
21 In next considering the appropriateness of mandamus and in reserving the jurisdictional
issue to the end, Marshall seems to be saying that Marbury should prevail in an action against
Madison if he would bring his action in a court of original jurisdiction. Reportedly Marbury
never received his commission; the five-year term expired first.
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The Power of the Court
The final question examined in the opinion is "the power of this
court" to issue the writ. The opinion treats this as though it involved
two parts only: (1) Is section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act which
purports to grant such power unconstitutional in that it attempts to
enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in violation of
Article III, and (2) is the Court free to make its own determination
of this question in deciding whether it should proceed with this case?
Arguably, however, there are other questions distinctly involved, and
again, it may be said that even with respect to these two questions
the Court should have treated them in a different order."
Statutory Interpretation
Certainly the first question is the following one of statutory
interpretation which was just barely treated in the opinion: Did
section 13 of the Judiciary Act authorize this action to originate in
the Supreme Court? The section provides:
And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a
state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except
also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. And
shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings
against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics,
or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consis-
tently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers,
or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the trial of
issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against
citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court
shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and
courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provid-
ed for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district
courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States. 6
If acts of Congress are not judicially reviewable on grounds of constitutionality, by
definition, the Court is not to consider the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act.
1 Section 14 of the Judiciary Act grants power to federal courts "to issue writs of scire
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Marshall quotes only the fragment at the end, perfunctorily notes
that Madison holds office under the authority of the United States
and therefore "is precisely within the letter of the description," and
since he has already established that mandamus would otherwise be
an appropriate remedy he quickly concludes that section 13 purports
to authorize this case. But there is no discussion of whether this
section confers original jurisdiction over suits seeking mandamus
against persons holding office under the authority of the United
States, or whether it merely authorizes mandamus to be so employed
by the Court in cases properly on appeal or in aid of its original
jurisdiction in cases involving foreign ministers or states. If it means
only the latter, and if Marbury has no other basis for commencing
his case in the Supreme Court, then the Court should simply dismiss
the case for want of (statutory) jurisdiction and it need not, and
ought not, examine the constitutionality of section 13 under some
other construction. An argument can be made, of course, that
section 13 did not attempt to grant original jurisdiction in
Marbury's case.
The section opens by describing the Court's original jurisdiction
and then moves on to describe appellate jurisdiction ("hereinafter
specially provided for"). Textually, the provision regarding
mandamus says nothing expressly as to whether it is part of original
or appellate jurisdiction or both, and the clause itself does not speak
at all of "conferring jurisdiction" on the court. The grant of
"power" to issue the writ, however, is juxtaposed with the section of
appellate jurisdiction and, in fact, follows the general description of
appellate jurisdiction in the same sentence, being separated only by a
semicolon. No textual mangling is required to confine it to appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, no mangling is required even if it attaches
both to original and to appellate jurisdiction, not as an enlargement
of either, but simply as a specification of power which the Court is
authorized to use in cases which are otherwise appropriately under
consideration. Since this case is not otherwise within the specified
type of original jurisdiction (e.g., it is not a case in which a state is a
party or a case against an ambassador), it should be diimissed.
facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry
into the case of commitment." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 8 1.
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Such an interpretation would have eliminated any question
regarding the constitutionality of the section, and thus it should have
been made. Indeed the statute readily bears such an interpretation
when compared with the very modest change in language Congress
subsequently made in response to Marbury v. Madison:
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of
prohibition in the district courts, when proceeding as courts of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and writs of mandamus, in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts
appointed under the authority of the United States, or to persons
holding office under the authority of the United States, where a
State. or an ambassador, or other public minister, or a consul or
vice-consul is a party."-1
Judicial Review
Assuming that section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 does
confer original jurisdiction in this case, is its constitutionality subject
to judicial review? Marshall initially responds to this question,
which, of course, is the issue which has made the case of historic
importance,28 by posing his own rhetorical question: "whether an
Act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land."
That it cannot is clear, he says, from the following considerations.
The people in an exercise of their "original right," established the
government pursuant to a written constitution which defines and
limits the powers of the legislature. A "legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law," therefore, as it is contrary to the original and
supreme will which organized the legislature itself.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained? . . . It is a proposition
too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
Rev. Stat. § 688 (emphasis added).
:' At the time Marbury was decided judicial review may have been of less political interest
than the question of executive accountability through the courts. See note 48 infra and
accompanying text.
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like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it . . .
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution .
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void ...
That the Constitution is a "written" one yields little or nothing
as to whether acts of Congress may be given the force of positive law
notwithstanding the opinion of judges, the executive, a minority or
majority of the population, or even of Congress itself (assuming that
Congress might sometimes be pressed by political forces to adopt a
law against its belief that it lacked power to do so) that such Acts
are repugnant to the Constitution. That this is so is clear enough
simply from the fact that even in Marshall's time (and to a great
extent today), a number of nations maintained written constitutions
and yet gave national legislative acts the full force of positive law
without providing any constitutional check to guarantee the
compatibility of those acts with their constitutions.2 9
This observation, moreover, leads to the conclusion that
Marshall presents a false dilemma in insisting that "'[t]he
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
11 E.g.. France, Switzerland, and Belgium (and to some extent Great Britain where Magna
Carta and other written instruments are roughly described as the constitution but where acts of
Parliament are not reviewable).
The French Constitution of 1789 stated explicitly: "'The tribunals cannot interfere in the
exercise of legislative power, nor suspend the execution of the laws, nor encroach upon the
administrative functions, nor cite before them the administrators on account of their




like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it." Remember, the question he has posed is "whether an Act
repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land." The
question is not whether Congress can alter the Constitution by
means other than those provided by Article V, and the case raises no
issue concerning an alteration of any provision in the Constitution.
We may assume that Congress cannot, by simple act, alter the
Constitution and still we may maintain that an act which the Court
or someone else believes to be repugnant to the Constitution shall be
given the full force of positive law until repealed. Again, this is the
situation which prevails in many other countries, and no absurdity is
felt to exist where such a condition obtains.
To be sure, situations can be imagined (and may arise in fact)
where an act of Congress seems so clearly repugnant to the
Constitution that one may wonder what function the Constitution
can usefully serve if such a law is nevertheless given the full force of
positive law until repealed. Marshall's illustrations of such situations
are quite compelling in this regard, e.g., an act of Congress
providing that one may be convicted of treason upon testimony of a
single witness, or confession out of court, in the "very teeth" of the
provision in Article II I, section 3, that "no person shall be convicted
of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court."
This leads, then, directly to the third point Marshall makes with
a -rhetorical flourish: "To what purpose are powers limited, . . . if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?" Thus he argues by implication that no other purpose
can be imagined and so it follows that the purpose of preventing acts
of Congress repugnant to the Constitution from being given the
effect of positive law is the necessary purpose of prescribing written
limitations on its power. Again, however, a variety of excellent
purposes are felt to be served in other countries with similar
constitutional provisions but without detracting from the positive
law effect of all legislative acts. Thus the written limitations serve as
a conscientious check on the legislators, admonishing each and
advising each concerning the responsibility he has to respect the
limitations thus laid down. The very fact, for instance, that the
minimum proof for treason is prescribed in Article III makes it far
less likely than otherwise that Congress would attempt to enact a
(Vol. 1969: 1
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lesser standard, and this is. so wholly aside from whether such an
attempt would still be given the effect of positive law. Again, the
written limitations may be useful politically; they may figure in
congressional debates, furnishing argumentative force as well as a
personal conscientious restraint, against the enactment of repressive
bills.3 0 Finally, there is the purpose the Constitution would serve in
providing a political check upon Congress by the people, even
assuming that all acts of Congress were given the full effect of
positive law by the courts as well as by the executive. Indeed
consistent with Marshall's own observation that the people
themselves established these written limitations, the democratic
approach is to leave the judgment and remedy for alleged legislative
usurpation with the people. If they conclude the Constitution has
been violated, they can exert political pressure to effect the repeal of
the offending act or to replace their congressmen at times of election
with representatives who will effectuate that repeal. The document
thus provides the people with a firm, written normative standard to
which to repair in making political decisions.
Unwillingness of the courts to give effect to acts of Congress
which the Supreme Court might conclude were repugnant to the
Constitution is thus quite unnecessary to the accomplishment of
several significant purposes which might still be served. In certain
respects, moreover, it may even be said to work at cross purposes
with these other salutary aims. For instance, it tends to encourage
congressional indifference to considerations of constitutionality by
implying that questions of this sort are none of its concern and are
entrusted, rather, only to the Court. Such a tendency was utilized by
President Roosevelt when he urged a House subcommittee chairman
to resolve all constitutional doubts about a given bill in favor of the
bill, "leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate
question of constitutionality."3 In addition it may frustrate acts of
Congress frequently considers the constitutionality of its bills and the character of the
debate is as often as not less concerned with whether the bill, if enacted, would be upheld by
the Supreme Court and more concerned simply with whether the bill seems basically
compatible with the Constitution. For instance, in the debate accompanying the school-aid
bills, compatibility with the first amendment was widely discussed even though it was generally
assumed that the bill, if enacted, probably could not be brought to the Supreme Court for review
due to Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1923). But see Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
1' 4 THE PU3LIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297-98 (1938).
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Congress even when the people, whose "original and supreme will
organizes the government," find no repugnance to their own
Constitution.32
Finally, however, there is the reference to the supremacy clause in
Article VI which Marshall uses partly to show, again, "that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void" (as well as to show that it does
not bind the judiciary). To be sure, the clause does provide that
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land," and thus the text appears to require that acts of Congress be
made "pursuant" to the authority (and limitations) of the
Constitution to be effective as supreme law. But this does not
necessarily support Marshall's conclusion that no act of Congress
believed by the Court to be repugnant to the Constitution shall be
given full positive-law effect.
The phrase "in pursuance thereof" might as easily mean "in the
manner prescribed by this Constitution," in which case acts of
Congress might be judicially reviewable as to their procedural
integrity, but not as to their substance. An example of this more
limited, procedural, judicial review is found in Field v. Clark.3 It is,
moreover, far more common in other countries than is substantive
constitutional review."
In brief, while [substantive] judicial review has recently attracted
more attention abroad, the actual institutional consequences of this
show of interest have so far been negligible.
On the other hand, it is a commonly recognized principle of
public law in continental countries that courts of final jurisdiction
may inquire whether statutes involved in cases before them were
: See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
3 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
For an early English example of procedural judicial review, see Pylkington's Case, Y. B. 33
Henry VI, 17 pl. 8, discussed in Lloyd, Pylkington's Case and Its Successors, 69 U. PA. L.
REV. 20 (1920).
One might assume that inasmuch as the Court will exercise procedural review over Acts of
Congress, it would surely also exercise procedural review over amendments to the Constitution
where the issue is appropriately raised in a particular case. Ironically, however, the Court has
indicated that it may exercise very little review respecting the constitutionality of the manner in
which an amendment is promulgated, allegedly because the issues tend to raise "political
questions." See, e.g.. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The uncertainty thus created
with respect to Article V of the Constitution is well illustrated by the series of articles in 66
MicH. L. REV. (1968), commenting on recent efforts by thirty-two states to convene a
constitutional convention.
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enacted by the proper constitutional procedure. This type of judicial
review, if such it should be considered, may be termed "formal," to
distinguish it from "material," or true, judicial review. The one is
concerned with the procedure of statutory enactment, the other with
the substance and content of the statutes. Formal, or procedural,
judicial review is much the less rigorous of the two. While a content
forbidden by the courts may be supplied by the legislature only in
consequence of a constitutional amendment or the reversal by the
courts of their unfavorable attitude, a misstep in the process of
legislative enactment is usually easily remediable?'
Thus, the only constitutional issue to be raised in a judicial
forum to determine whether an act of Congress should be given
effect is whether the bill has been enacted according to the forms
prescribed in the Constitution. Its substantive constitutionality, e.g.,
whether it exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress or violates a
stated limitation on those powers, is reserved for the people to
determine and for them to resolve through the political process. It is,
therefore, significant that the clause does not provide as follows:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States authorized
and not limited thereby. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
The phrase might also mean merely that only those statutes
adopted by Congress after the re-establishment and reconstitution of
Congress pursuant to the Constitution itself shall be the supreme law
of the land, whereas acts of the earlier Continental Congress,
constituted merely under the Articles of Confederation, would not
necessarily be supreme and binding upon the several states. Under
this view, acts of Congress, like acts of Parliament, are the supreme
law and not to be second-guessed by any court, state or federal, so
long as they postdate ratification of the Constitution. 6
Finally, however, there is another point which also necessarily
shades into Marshall's related discussion of whether an act
repugnant to the Constitution is nonetheless binding upon the courts.
The point is that Marshall arguably may have begged a critical
* Corwin, Judicial Review. V III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 457, 463 (1932).
* For a careful elaboration of 'this point, see W. CROSSKEY, II POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 990-1007.
As distinguished from acts of Congress, treaties were binding upon the several states accord-
ing to this view merely by having been entered into "'under the Authority of the United States."
and irrespective of whether they were approved by the Senate as it was proposed to be established
pursuant to the new Constitution.
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question, Le., he failed' to acknowledge and thus to answer a question
critical to the position he takes. Assuming that an act repugnant to
the Constitution is not a law "in pursuance thereof' and thus must
not be given effect as the supreme law of the land, who, according to
the Constitution, is to make the determination as to whether any
given law is in fact repugnant to the Constitution itself? Such alleged
repugnance is ordinarily not self-demonstrating in most cases, as we
well know. Marshall never confronts .this question. His substitute
question, whether a law repugnant to the Constitution still binds the
courts, assumes that such "repugnance" has appropriately been
determined by those granted such power under the Constitution. It is
clear, however, that the supremacy clause itself cannot be the clear
textual basis for a claim by the judiciary that this prerogative to
determine repugnancy belongs to it.
On its face, the clause does not say by whom or how or at what
time it shall be determined whether certain laws of the United States
were adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Again, the phrase that
only such laws shall be part of the supreme law could mean merely
that the people should regard the Constitution with deep concern and
that they should act to prevent Congress from overstepping the
Constitution. It might even imply, moreover, a right of civil
disobedience or serve as a written reminder to government of the
natural right of revolution against tyrannical government which
oversteps the terms of the social compact. Such a construction
would be consistent with philosophical writings of the period,
consistent with the Declaration of Independence, and consistent also
with the view of some antifederalists of the period. As a hortatory
reminder to the Government of the ultimate right of the people,
however, it clearly does not authorize the Court to make the critical
judgment as to which laws, if any, were not made in pursuance of the
Constitution.
There are still other points earnestly pressed by Marshall to be
considered, but they are made in response to a slightly different issue
which we shall have to restate in order to stay with our concern
regarding who is constitutionally authorized to determine whether an
act of Congress may be repugnant to the Constitution.
Marshall makes certain effective additional points in attempting
to answer the question: "If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the
[Vol. 1969: 1
MARBURY v. MADISON
courts, and oblige them to give it effect?" We shall look at the
discussion, however, partly to see whether it provides anything of a
convincing character that the determination of whether an act of
Congress is repugnant to the Constitution shall be made by the
courts. Marshall makes the following points:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law
and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the
law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The argument blurs the distinction between ordinary judicial
review and substantive constitutional review. It implies, wrongly,
that substantive constitutional review is as customary and necessary
as ordinary judicial review. To be specific, Marshall analogizes
between the acknowledged custom and authority of courts to
determine whether a given statute was in fact duly adopted, to
interpret statutes, and to choose between conflicting statutes, and the
allegedly equal propriety and necessity of choosing between the
Constitution and a statute which conflicts with it. From the
proposition that the judicial department must necessarily say what
the law "is," i.e., how a statute is to be interpreted, he derives the
corollary that therefore the judicial department must also say what
is "law" in some sense beyond that of determining merely whether a
purported statute is in fact an authentic legislative act, duly adopted
and properly enrolled. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
the powers of statutory interpretation, reconciliation, and procedural
review embrace the power of substantive constitutional review.
Again, in those countries such as England, where substantive
constitutional review does not exist,"7 courts still routinely interpret
11 The position of the English courts respecting acts of Parliament and substantive
constitutional review is well portrayed in the following statement by Lord Chief Justice Holt:
"An Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty
odd." City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669 (1700).
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the meaning and pass upon the formal authenticity of statutes.
Similarly, if two "laws" (statutes) conflict, such courts may apply
certain rules to determine which shall control the case, e.g., the
later in time. In fact they may have to do so in order to decide the
case before them. If the conflict is allegedly only between a statute
and a portion of the Constitution, however, the court can readily
give full effect to the law while declining to consider the alleged
conflict with the Constitution on the basis that such a maiter is
reserved solelv to the judgment of the people. Indeed in the sense of
Marshall's special usage, it was "emphatically the province and
.. duty" of legislative departments to say what the law is, and the
customary duty of judicial departments was merely to apply the law
to the case once the meaning and formal authenticity of the law were
established. There is, consequently, nothing either necessary or
customary to the claim of power which the Court presumed to assert
in this case."
(2) Those then who controvert the principle that the Constitution
is to be considered in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
Constitution, and see only the law.
This statement is only partly true, and is otherwise misleading.
Again the Court might well be vouchsafed the necessary prerogative
of constitutional review in the limited sense of being free to
determine whether an act of Congress was adopted in a manner
consistent with the Jormis described in the Constitution." Such
"procedural" review need not carry any implication regarding a
similar propriety or necessity for substantive review. That review is
made by the people who exercise a firm political check on the
constitutional judgment of Congress.
(3) This doctrine (that the Court lacks the power of substantive
constitutional review) would subvert the very foundation of all
written constitutions.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest
improvement on political institutions, a written constitution, would
of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have
been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.
See Eakin v. Raub. 12 S. & R. 330, 345-57 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson. J.. dissenting).
" To be consistent with the forms prescribed by the Constitution an act must be properly
enrolled, receive a majority vote in both Houses. be signed by the president, etc.
[Vol. 1969: 1
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We have already examined this point which Marshall made
earlier. It is sufficient to repeat here that a written constitution may
serve highly significant purposes without judicial review. In reposing
the judgment of constitutionality in the people alone, moreover, the
constitution may more nearly, respond to a democratic view.
(4) But the peculiar expressions of the Constitution . . . furnish
additional arguments in favor of its rejection (i.e., rejection of the
position that the Court lacks the power of substantive constitutional
review of Acts of Congress).
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases
arising under the Constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say
that in using it the Constitution should not be looked into? That a
case arising under the Constitution should be decided without
examining the instrument under which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases, then, the Constitution must be looked into by the
judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they
forbidden to read or to obey?
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to
support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner, to their
conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on
them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing
instruments, for violating what they swear to support!
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the
Constitution of the United States, if that Constitution forms no rule
for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected
by him?
This seems by all means the most effective part of Marshall's
presentation, drawing highly plausible support from the text of
Articles Ill and VI. For convenience, the latter point, the
significance of the judges' oath of office "to support this
Constitution," will be considered first.
Perhaps the best known response to this line of reasoning is
contained in the following passages by Justice Gibson, dissenting in
Eakin v. Raub:4 '"
But the judges are sworn to support the Constitution, and are
" 12 S. & R. 330 (Pa. 1825).
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they not bound by it as the law of the land?. . .The oath to support
the Constitution is not peculiar to the judges, but is taken
indiscriminately by every officer of the government, and is designed
rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind
the officer in the discharge of his duty: otherwise, it were difficult to
determine, what operation it is to have in the case of a recorder of
deeds, for instance, who, in the execution of his office, has nothing
to do with the Constitution. But granting it to relate to the official
conduct of the judge, as well as every other officer, and not to his
political principles, still, it must be understood in reference to
supporting the Constitution, only as far as that may be involved in
his official duty; and consequently, if his official duty does not
comprehend an inquiry into the authority of the legislature, neither
does his oath...
But do not the judges do a positive act in violation of the
Constitution, when they give effect to an unconstitutional law? Not
if the law has been passed according to the forms established in the
Constitution. The fallacy of the question is, in supposing that the
judiciary adopts the acts of the legislature as its own; whereas, the
enactment of a law and the interpretation of it are not concurrent
acts, and as the judiciary is not required to concur in the enactment,
neither is it in the breach of the constitution which may be the
consequence of the enactment; the fault is imputable to the
legislature, and on it the responsibility exclusively rests....
But does the Chief Justice finally strike paydirt when he observes
that Article III provides that "the judicial Power ... shall be vested
in one supreme Court," etc., and that this "judicial power shall
extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution," etc.? To
paraphrase Marshall, what sense does it make to say that all cases
arising under the Constitution are within the judicial power if, at the
same time, the Court is never free in such a case to consider the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress which has been drawn into
question in that very case?
Is it sufficient to reply that the Court may consider the question
of constitutionality, but that it must resolve that question according to
Congress' interpretation of the Constitution rather than according to
its own interpretation? Some have so suggested, noting again that
the Constitution itself is silent as to whose constitutional
interpretation shall be controlling even in the disposition of a case,
and contending that the interpretation made by Congress and subject
only to popular, but not judicial, review would be more compatible
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with the theory of democratic government. There are, however,
several shortcomings to this criticism. One, is that the business of
deciding a case does seem emphatically to be a. part of judicial
business. In the absence of a provision expressly withdrawing from
the courts the power to decide for themselves any significant issue
which must be resolved in order to dispose of the whole case,
including of course the challenged constitutionality of an act of
Congress, or instructing the Court to resolve any such issue
according to the decision of Congress or someone else, it would
appear to be the more natural inference that the judicial prerogative
is the same as to this issue as to any other unavoidably presented by
the case. It is not a sufficient answer to this point merely to say that
the issue of substantive constitutionality is so different in kind from
all other issues and that its reservation to Congress and to the people
is so fundamental to democratic theory that this difference alone is
sufficient to withdraw it from the courts. If it was felt to be so
different, we should expect the difference to be expressed and
provided for in the Constitution itself.
If the Court is always to resolve a question of substantive
constitutionality of an act of Congress only according to Congress'
own constitutional interpretation of its authority, necessarily it will
always uphold the act and the "judicial review" thus being exercised
seems to amount to nothing at all. Under these circumstances, it
seems trivial and strange that Article Ill would extend the judicial
power to all cases arising under the Constitution. It seems that it
would have been more logical not to bother with this category on the
understanding that acts of Congress are simply not to be questioned,
either by federal or by state courts, on grounds of constitutionality.
This necessarily leads to the question: Unless these phrases in
Article III contemplate independent judicial review of the
substantive constitutionality of Acts of Congress drawn into
question in cases arising under the Constitution, what purposes or
functions can this category of judicial power possibly or usefully
serve? Arguably, it would still serve a variety of very important
functions.
A case may arise under the Constitution in a clear and
straightforward sense and not in the least involve an Act of
Congress. Thus a person might file suit for damages from police
officers who he claims broke into his house without a warrant,
allegedly violating the fourth amendment via the fourteenth
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amendment. His "claim" arises under the Constitution in that he
asserts that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment itself
furnishes him with a remedial right to damages under these
circumstances. The case thus "arises " under the Constitution, it
would be reviewable in due course under the Court's appellate
jurisdiction (unless Congress excepted such jurisdiction)," and the
Court would be competent to decide for itself whether or not the
claim was well made. In the course of doing so, the Court might well
interpret the Constitution to determine whether the fourth and
fourteenth amendments implicitly provide for recovery in money
damages or whether they do not." Here, in such a situation the case
itself does arise under the Constitution, Congress has adopted no act
which provides an interpretation of the constitutional issue in
question, and quite naturally and necessarily the Court could review
the matter. Thus the clause has a function and an importance
independent of extending it to mean that the substantive
constitutionality of acts of Congress are judicially reviewable. In fact
this reading of the clause seems more natural and straightforward
than the one proposed by Marshall. Here the claim itself is asserted
as arising under the Constitution. Marshall would read the clause as
though it said "all cases in which an issue of constitutionality is
presented." But, of course, it does not say this.
Again, the clause might permit judicial review of cases involving
the federal constitutionality of state laws or state constitutional
provisions where Congress has adopted no act dispositive of the
question. Or the clause may even contemplate a limited review of
acts of Congress drawn into question in a case thus alleged to arise
under the Constitution, but the review would be strictly limited to
procedural constitutionality of the congressional act, as discussed
earlier.
It appears to follow, then, that cases may arise under the
Constitution having nothing to do with acts of Congress, and that
even in cases involving acts of Congress there is no inherent necessity
for the Court to exercise a power of independent substantive
constitutional review. To be sure, our analysis concedes the propriety
4 Article III appears to provide that Congress may create "exceptions" to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. See textual paragraph infra preceding the paragraph containing
notes 44-45.
"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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of such review in certain cases, not involving acts of Congress, while
denying it in others where acts of Congress are involved. To establish
a final point in Marshall's favor, does not a simple principle of
consistency require that judicial review should either be granted in all
cases, whether or not an act of Congress is challenged on
constitutional grounds, or in none of the cases all of which arise
under the Constitution? An argument can be made that the answer is
"no." Indeed we have already canvassed the argument and need only
summarize it here. In cases raising constitutional issues which
Congress has not attempted to resolve, the Court must of necessity
render its own interpretation of the part of the Constitution in
question if only to decide the case. Moreover, it should do so "to
support the Constitution." Where Congress has considered the issue
and has interpreted the Constitution in the course of adopting
relevant legislation, however, the matter is properly foreclosed to the
courts which are not to oppose themselves to Congress which is itself
fully answerable to the people. The Court is not similarly
answerable, of course, and thus certainly ought not supererogate a
power of judicial review for which it is politically unaccountable in
what we believe to be a democratic republic.13
Looking back, it may seem that an unfairness has been done to
Marshall's opinion. Each argument, and each textual fragment on
which the argument rested, may not seem especially compelling by
itself. However, perhaps the separate pieces support each other, the
fragments draw together, and the "whole" of Marshall's argument is
much better than each part separately considered.
"'A different point based in Articles Ill and Vi has been raised in favor of judicial review
elsewhere, and might briefly be considered at this time. The point is that Article VI
contemplates that state courts shall have to pass upon questions of constitutional
interpretation, and that it is hardly imaginable that the scope of judicial review of such
decisions in the Supreme Court would be less broad. The point does not carry far. Again, the
prerogative of state and federal courts to interpret the Constitution other than %%hen an act of
Congress is involved need not be denied. Moreover. even though Article VI may anticipate that
state courts will initially be reviewing acts of Congress which are simply drawn into controversy
in cases properly originating in the state courts, that does not mean that such courts are to ques-
tion the constitutionality of such acts. Rather, it may mean only that the state court judges are
bound to apply those acts as the supreme law. "anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.*' More than this, if Congress becomes dissatisfied with
state court treatment of its statutes, rather than worrying about it Congress may simply forbid
such matters to be litigated in the state courts. See. e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944).
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Constitutionality of Section 13
Assuming that section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 does
confer original jurisdiction in this case, and assuming also that its
substantive constitutionality is subject to independent judicial review,
is that section constitutional? In view of the extended discussion
above, this issue is almost anti-climactic. Still, it has its own practical
and legal importance. If the Court had concluded that the act was
constitutional, presumably it would have issued the writ against
Madison. If Madison, on Jefferson's instruction, had refused to
honor that writ how would it have been enforced? Who would
enforce it? The prospect of this problem may well have influenced
the decision as to the constitutionality of section 13.
Essentially, Marshall's argument that the act is unconstitutional
comes- to this: Article III restricts the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme' Court to certain limited types of cases, those "affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party." Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
attempts to expand the Court's original jurisdiction beyond the
limitation provided in Article 1Il, and section 13 is therefore
repugnant to the Constitution. Since a close reading of Article Ill
itself will not discover any explicit statement clearly providing that
the Court's original jurisdiction cannot be expanded to absorb some
cases that might otherwise fall only within its appellate jurisdiction,
however, it becomes necessary to study Marshall's opinion to
determine on what basis he correctly, or incorrectly, inferred such a
limitation. Marshall acknowledges the point just made and attempts
to answer in the following fashion:
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the
legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and
inferior .courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly
have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the
judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The
subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without
meaning, if such is to be the construction. If Congress remains at
liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be




Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other
objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive
sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is
inadmissible, unless the words require it.
Here, as elsewhere, Marshall's essential point is that any
interpretation other than the one he finds would leave the text being
interpreted without any significance and would have to serve no
useful purpose." In this, he has clearly overstated the situation.
Indeed his own interpretation may weaken the Court's power far
more than another interpretation wholly compatible with the text of
Article Ill, section 2, clause two.
The clause readily supports a meaningful interpretation that the
Court's original jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress, but
that it may be supplemented by adding to it original jurisdiction over
some cases which would otherwise fall only within its appellate
jurisdiction. Such a reading makes sense and makes no part of the
clause surplusage. Thus it might be supposed that certain kinds of
cases-those affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a state shall be a Party-could have
been regarded by the framers of Article III as of such importance
that they should enjoy original access to the Supreme Court. Cases
affecting Ambassadors might be felt as involving such sensitive
relations with foreign countries, and cases in which a state is a party
might be felt as involving sensitive issues of federalism or interstate
relations, that neither a state nor an Ambassador should be
answerable in an inferior court. Arguably, therefore, these cases
merely constitute an irreducible minimum of Supreme Court
original jurisdiction: cases which Congress may not relegate
exclusively for trial elsewhere.
It is true, of course, that the very next sentence provides that "in
all the other Cases before mentioned (including cases arising under
" It can be plausibly argued, however, that the Article III division of judicial power between
appellate and original jurisdiction served a useful purpose other than that insisted upon by
Marshall. Had Congress not adapted the Judiciary Act of 1789 or taken any other action
describing Supreme Court jurisdiction, the division itself would have provided a guideline for
the Court to folloN until Congress was inclined to act. Not knowing whether that future Con-
gress would consider the issue, perhaps the framers merely provided for the division of Supreme
Court jurisdiction against the contingency of congressional action.
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'the Laws of the United States' such as Marbury's case), the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact," but the comma is immediately followed by the qualification:
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." It is reasonable to read this as saying that Congress
may except certain cases otherwise subject only to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction by adding them to the Court's original
jurisdiction, which, it might be added, is precisely what Congress
did in section 13 of the Judiciary Act. This construction of the whole
clause is sensible and leaves nothing as mere surplusage.
It is also noteworthy that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted
by the first Congress organized under the new Constitution, just two
years after the Constitution was proposed and in the same year that
it took effect, and that some of the same men who participated in the
Constitutional Convention also participated in the enactment of the
Judiciary Act. The Court should assume that the first Congress
knew what it -was doing. In McCulloch v. Maryland,' Marshall
upheld a federal statute and observed: "The power now contested
was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present
constitution .... It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity
to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances was a
bold and plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no
countenance."
In other respects, affirmative words have not been taken as
negativing other objects than those affirmed, although they more
generally have been so treated. For instance, Article 1, section 8,
clause 6 authorizes Congress "to provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States,"
but this has not been construed as impliedly forbidding Congress to
impose penalties for other reasons.46
But more practically, Marshall's construction of Article III does
much more to weaken the Court's power, including even its power of
constitutional review, than would have resulted from another
construction perfectly available to him. It is ironic that this would
have occurred in the very case celebrated because of its alleged
aggrandizement of judicial power. Under Marshafl's construction,
Congress may .not add to the Court's original jurisdiction but it
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
SSee also Cohens v. Virginia, 20 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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may, by simple act, subtraci from the Court's appellate jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction being subject to "such Exceptions . . . as the
Congress shall make." It is really cases within its appellate
jurisdiction, however, where nearly all of the Court's significant
work is done. Thus Marshall's opinion implies that Congress may
readily undercut the whole power of constitutional review simply by
cutting back on the Court's appellate jurisdiction in such a fashion'
that it never gets a case in which to exercise its power of that
review. ' Similarly, Congress could avoid constitutional review of its
acts in the inferior courts by eliminating such courts-something
clearly within its constitutional authority."
However this may be, it is possible that Marshall missed a
chance for the Court. He could have held: (a) the Article ill grant of
Supreme Court original jurisdiction is an irreducible minimum; and
(b) Congress may supplement that jurisdiction by excepting cases
otherwise within the appellate jurisdiction; and (c) indeed the only
way in which Congress may create exceptions to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction is by means of adding such cases to its original
jurisdiction because Article III itself provides that "the judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,"
and this necessarily means that the whole power shall be vested in
one way or the other. However, it is conceivable that such a theory
could work against the Court, by allowing Congress to sink the
Court beneath an unbearable workload of cases assigned to its
original jurisdiction.
See. e.g.. Lx purte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
- If Congress could block review by state courts, as %ell as federal courts, it thus could
effectively establish congressional supremacy. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944). But see Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. II, 37 U.S.L.W. 4053,
4056 n.6 (U.S.. Dec. 16, 1968) (concurring opinion) ("It is doubtful whether a person may be
deprived of his personal liberty without the prior opportunity to be heard by some tribunal
competent fully to adjudicate his claims.*'); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.l I
(1962) ("There is a serious question whether the McCardle case could command a majority
view today."). See alvo Hearings on -The Supreme Court' Bejore the Subcomnim. on
Separation ol Powers oJ the Senate Conint. on the Judiciary. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
Hart, The Power oJ Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic. 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate
Jurisdiction: Historical Basis. 47 MINN. L. Rrv. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congressional Power Over
the Appellate Jurisdiction oJ the Supreme Court. 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Sedler,
Linitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction o/ the Supreme Court. 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 99
(1958).
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Ill. A SPECIFICATION 01- THE HoinIN ON CONSTITUTIONAl.
REVIEW
In litigation befbre the Supreme Court, the Court may refitse to
give eJfect to an act oJ Congress where the act pertains to the judicial
power itselJ' In deciding whether to give effect to such an act, the
Court may determine its decision according to its own itterpretation
of constitutional pro visions which describe the judicial po wer.
Thus described, the holding in Marbury v. Madison is less
remarkable than generally supposed. It is also, however, far more
defensible because it draws upon one's sympathy to maintain the
Court as a co-ordinate branch of government, and not as a superior
branch. It represents a defensive use of constitutional review alone,
acquiring considerable support from the concept of separated
powers. It merely minds the Court's own business (i.e., what cases
shall originate in the Court, what cases shall be treated on appeal or
otherwise). Were the Court to lack this capacity, it could scarcely be
able to maintain even the ordinary function of nonconstitutional
judicial review.
An excellent statement which deflates and rehabilitates Marbury
v. Madison appears in a recent article by Professor Strong." As he
puts it:
Very possibly this is one explanation of the fact that the full
development of judicial review of constitutionality was a much
slower process than is almost universally assumed. Marbury r.
Madison claimed this power for the United States Supreme Court
only in the defensive sense of safeguarding the Court's original
jurisdiction from congressional enlargement. A clearer case of
defensive judicial review of constitutionality for the protection of the
judicial power against legislative tinkering had been Bayard v.
Singleton (I N.C. (I Martin) 48 (1787)), the decision of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina which is generally acknowledged to have
been the strongest precedent for constitutional review prior to the
Philadelphia Convention. Of Bayard v. Singleton Louis Boudin
wrote with rare insight, -Not only did this case not involve the
confiscation laws as such, but it did not even involve the question of
trial by jury, which it is commonly alleged to have involved. For the
question was not whether a trial ought to be with or without a jury,
Strong, Judicial Review: A fri-Dinensional Concept oJ .4diinisratie-C'ontitiititiotia
Law 69 W. 'VA. L. REV. III, 249 (1967).
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but whether there should be a trial at all i.e.. whether the judges
had a right to hear the cases. And one need not be a supporter of the
Judicial Power in any of its formulations in order to believe that the
Judiciary have a right to hear and determine cases." (I
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 66 (1931).
If Mr. Boudin had no quarrel with the North Carolina case,
what made his two-volume work on Government bY Judiciary so
severe a condemnation of what he called the Judicial Power? [he
explanation lies in the extension of constitutional judicial review to
acts of Congress; to separation-of-powers conflicts between
legislative and executive branches, which are of no such concern to
the courts as are those conflicts involving the courts' own powers; to
federalistic questions; and to direct limitations on the powers of
government. These several forms of extension occupied a
considerable portion of the nineteenth century; the end of the full
development can be dated as late as 1890, the year in which Chicago.
1. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (134 U.S. 418 (1890)) subjected rate
regulation to the rigors of substantive due process. That the great
portion of the development of judicial review of constitutionality,
measured at least in terms of significance, postdates Marbury v.
Madison is the insight of a commentator on the development of
American constitutional law. Observed he: *It is with Fletcher v.
Peck [1810] that the unforeseen possibilities ofjudicial review begin
to appear.' (WRIGHT. THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 78 (1942)).
We have thus far described the holding respecting constitutional
review in Marburv as a very limited thing by concentrating on the
character of the act of Congress actually involved in the case. As
thus limited, it is fair to conclude that the case does not establish
constitutional review of acts of Congress regarding any subject other
than the judicial power itself, e.g., it does not establish such review
for acts concerning "separation-of-powers conflicts between
legislative and executive branches, which are of no such concern to
the courts as are those conflicts involving the courts' own powers; to
federalistic questions; and to direct limitations on the powers of
government."
It must be conceded, however, that this view of "the holding" is
one we bring to the case rather than one which clearly characterizes
Marshall's opinion. Even an unhurried rereading of the case is not
likely to suggest that Marshall was emphasizing, or limiting himself
to, the legitimacy of constitutional review used only defensively in
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the protection of the balance of judicial power. For instance, he does
not emphasize the concept of separation of powers in this limited
sense, but considers it in the more grandiose sense that the whole
business of interpreting "law"-including the "law" of the
Constitution-is emphatically judicial business. Remember also his
statement, which seems to look well beyond the character of the case
at hand: "In some cases, then, the Constitution must be looked into
by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they
forbidden to read or to obey?"
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the "holding" has been
generally regarded as a broader one which carries at least this far: In
litigation before the Supreme Court, the Court may rejitse to give
elfct to an act of Congress where, in the Court's own view, that act
is repugnant to the Constitution.
. This is, of course, a significantly broader holding than the first
one suggested. It means that the Court will withhold its power even
when the efficacy of an act of Congress depends on the co-operation
of that power against private citizens, corporate interests, state
interests, or executive interests, whenever the Court concludes that
the act is repugnant to the Court's own interpretation of some
constitutional provision. It may be characterized by the phrase
"national, substantive constitutional review."
Even this breadth of holding, however, falls far short of
cementing the notion of "judicial supremacy." It does not mean, for
instance, that either Congress or the President need defer to Supreme
Court interpretations of the Constitution so far as their own
deliberations are concerned and so far as the efficacy of their power
does not depend upon judicial co-operation.
When a bill is under consideration, for example, Congress might
conscientiously reject the bill believing that bill to be
unconstitutional even assuming that the Court has provided no
precedent for that belief and even assuming that the Court has itself
upheld similar legislation adopted by an earlier Congress. Similarly,
the President may veto the bill on the grounds of his own
interpretation of the Constitution-whether or not it is the same as
the Court's. So, too, might he decline to enforce an act of Congress
on such a basis.5 0
5° Should a president refuse to enforce an act of Congress on the ground that he believed the
act to be unconstitutional, he may incur the political risk of impeachment if Congress chooses
to describe his conduct as failing in his duty faithfully to execute the laws.
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The concept of national, substantive judicial review, moreover,
does not preclude independent prerogatives of Congress and the
President to prefer their own constitutional interpretations even
when the Court, for its part, has interpreted the Constitution in such
a manner as to sustain the bill. A clear instance might involve the
use of the executive clemency power, used by Jefferson to pardon
those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts which had been
upheld in the lower federal courts, on the grounds that in the
President's own view those acts were repugnant to the Con-
stitution. A harder instance might involve the decision of the
President not to enforce an act of Congress because of his own belief
that it was unconstitutional, even after the act had been tested and
upheld in the Supreme Court.
There is, then, no doctrine of national, substantive judicial
supremacy which inexorably flows from Marbury v. Madison itself,
i.e., no doctrine that the only interpretation of the Constitution
which all branches of the national government must employ is the
interpretation which the Court may provide in the course of
litigation.
Beyond this lies the observation that Marburr does not pass
upon the separate question of federal substantive constitutional
review or Jederal substantive judicial supremacy. The case provides
no occasion to determine the role of the states in the interpretation
of the Constitution; no issue of federalism is present in the case. By
itself, it does not settle any of these questions: (1) Are state courts
bound by Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution
respecting the constitutionality of federal laws, and (2) are state
courts bound by Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution
respecting the constitutionality of state laws? To put the matter more
orthodoxly, are state court judgments involving interpretations of
the United States Constitution subject to revision by the Supreme
Court? This question presents new considerations of federalism not
treated in Marbury. They might have been answered in favor of state
determinism, without disturbing Marburv's "holding" as to
national, substantive judicial review." The issue was, of course,
resolved in favor of federal constitutional review.' 2
See J. NIAlISO\. Ri-PORT ON Till- \IR ,\iA RtisotLLTIO'NS (1800).
"See. e.g., (.ohens v. Virginia. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821): Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816): Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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If, at this juncture, it should be thought surprising that Marbur'
v. Madison could sensibly be considered by anyone as authoritatively
establishing the doctrine of federal substantive judicial supremacy,
however, one need look no further than the Supreme Court itself to
find an example of such a view! In Cooper v. Aaron," the Court said
the following with respect to the exclusiveness of its own
constitutional interpretations as applied to state laws and the
obligations of state officials:
This decision [Marbur" v. Madison] declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system.
IV. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS RE THE "LEGITIMACY" OF
HORIZONTAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Because of the difficulty in drawing together the various
historical source materials, the following excerpts are here collected
to lend some insight into the constitutional viewpoints contemporary
with the Marbury decision.
Excerpts from The Federalist (Nos. 78, 81)
[T]he judiciary . . . will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution. . . . The judiciary . . . has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
§trength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon
the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction
they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may
be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is
not to be collected from any particular provisions in the
Constitution.. . . It is far more rational to suppose that the courts
were designed to be an intermediate body between the people aind the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws
"358 U.S. I, 17-19 (1958).
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is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is,
in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to
be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the
intention of their agents.
i-rom a body [such as Congress] which had even a partial agency
in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper
and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had
operated in making them would be too apt in interpreting them, still
less could it be expected that men who had infringed the
Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed to
repair the breach in that of judges.
I-xcerptsfroni The Antijederalist Papers (Borden, ed., 1965, pp. 222-
40; the following by "Brutus" [thought to be either Thomas
Treadwell or Robert Yates], and originally appearing in the New
York Journal, March 20-April 10, 1788)
The judges in England are under the control of the legislature,
for they are bound to determine according to the laws passed by
them. But the judges under this constitution will control the
legislature, for the supreme court are authorized in the last resort, to
determine what is the extent of the powers of the Congress. They are
to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above
them to set aside their judgment.
The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the
legislature. I have showed, in a former paper, [see Antifederalist
Nos. 80, 81, 82] that this court will be authorized to decide upon the
meaning of the constitution, and that, not only according to the
natural and obvious meaning of the words, but also according to the
spirit and intention of it. In the exercise of this power they will not
be subordinate to, but above the legislature. For all the departments
of this government will receive their powers, so far as they
are expressed in the constitution, from the people immediately, who
are the source of power. The legislature can only exercise such
powers as are given them by the constitution; they cannot assume
any of the rights annexed to the judicial; for this plain reason, that
the same authority which vested the legislature with their powers,
Vol. 1969: 11
DUKI LA W JOL R.Y. [l9
vested the judicial with theirs. Both are derived from the same
source; both therefore are equally valid, and the judicial hold their
powers independently of the legislature, as the legislature do of the
judicial. The supreme court then have a right, independent of the
legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part
of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their
construction or do it away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any
laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the
constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect
their power is superior to that of the legislature. . . . The judges are
supreme-and no law, explanatory of the constitution, will be
binding on them.
Earlier Expressions by John Marshall
In a speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1788,
Marshall approved the Judiciary Article and declared:
If they [Congress], were to make a law not warranted by any or
the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the [National]
judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to
guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their
jurisdiction. They would declare it void. . . . To what quarter will
you look for protection from an infringement of the Constitution, if
you will not give the power to the judiciary? There is no other body
that can afford such a protection. A. BEVERIDGE. I THE LIFE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 452 (1916).
Compare the following position communicated by Marshall to
Mr. Justice Chase on January 23, 1804, in the course of Chase's
impeachment trial:
According to the ancient doctrine a jury. finding a verdict against
the law of the case was liable to an attaint; & the amount of the
present doctrine seems to be that a Judge giving a legal opinion
contrary to the opinion of the legislature is liable to impeachment.
As, for convenience & humanity, the old doctrine of attaint has
yielded to the silent, moderate but not less operative influence of new
trials, I think the modern doctrine of impeachment should yield to
an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal
opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would certainly better
comport with the mildness of our character than [would] a removal
of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing of his fault. A.
BEVERIDGE, III THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177 (1916).
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Expressions in the Philadelphia and State Conventions
Remarks by Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts) in opposition to a
proposal that the Constitution provide for a Council of Revision
consisting of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the President of
the United States, with power to veto Acts of Congress, speaking in
the Philadelphia Convention meeting as a Committee of the Whole,
June 4, 1787:
Mr. GERRY doubts whether the judiciary ought to form a part
of it, as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on
their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved
a power of deciding on their constitutionality. In some states the
judges had actually set aside laws, as being against the constitution.
This was-done, too, with general approbation. It was quite foreign
from the nature of their office to make them judges of the policy of
public measures. He moves to postpone the clause, in order to
propose, "that the national executive shall have a right to negative
any legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by
parts of each branch of the national legislature. [Motion adopted, 6
votes to 4.] \v ELLIOT'S DEBATES 151 [Madison's Diary] (1937).
Remarks by Luther Martin (Maryland), in opposition of joining
Supreme Court Justices in a Council of Revision, speaking in the
Philadelphia Convention, July 21, 1787:
Mr. L. MARTIN considered the association of the judges with
the executive as a dangerous innovation, as well as one that could
not produce the particular advantage expected from it. A knowledge
of mankind, and of legislative affairs, cannot be presumed to belong
in a higher degree to the judges than to the legislature. And as to the
constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the judges in
their official character. In this character they have a negative on the
laws. Join them with the executive on the revision, and they will have
a double negative. It is necessary that the supreme judiciary should
have the confidence of the people. This will soon be lost, if they are
employed in the task of remonstrating against popular measures of
the legislature. Besides, in what mode and proportion are they to
vote in the council of revision? V ELLIOT'S DEBATES 346-47
[Madison's Diary] (1937).
Then follow remarks by Madison, favoring combining the Judges
and the Executive in the Council of Revision, followed by Mason
(Virginia) to the same effect, and adding:
Col. MASON observed, that the defense of the executive was not
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the sole object of the revisionary power. He expected even greater
advantage from it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the
constitution of the legislature, it would still so much resemble that of
the individual states, that it must be expected frequently to pass
unjust and pernicious laws. This restraining power was therefore
essentially necessary. It should have the effect, not only of hindering
the final passage of such laws, but would discourage demagogues
from attempting to get them passed. It has been said, (by Mr. L.
Martin), that if the judges were joined in this check on the laws, they
would have a double negative, since in their expository capacity of
judges, they would have one negative. He would reply, that in this
capacity they could impede in one case only the operation of laws,
They could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to
every law however unjust, oppressive, or pernicious, that did not
come plainly under this description, they would be under the
necessity,* as judges, to give it a free course. He wished the further
use to be made of the judges of giving aid in preventing every
improper law. (The motion so to join the judiciary in the revision of
laws then lost, 3 votes to 4, 2 states dividing, one not present.) V
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 347-48 [Madison's Diary] (1937).
Remarks by Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylyania), John Dickinson
(Delaware), and John Mercer, on further proposal by Madison for
vesting limited legislative veto power partly in the judiciary, speaking
in the Philadelphia Convention, August 15, 1787:
Mr. MERCER heartily approved the motion. It is an axiom that
the judiciary ought to be separate from the legislative, but equally
so, that it ought to be independent of that department. The true
policy of the axibm is, that legislative usurpation and oppression
may be obviated. He disapproved of the doctrine, that the judges, as
expositors of the Constitution, should hiive the authority to declare a
law void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and
then to be uncontrollable.
Mr. GERRY. This motion comes to the same thing with what
has been already negatived.
[Madison's motion was then voted upon and lost, 3 votes to 8].
Mr. DICKINSON was strongly impressed with the remark of
Mr. Mercer, as to the power of the judges to set aside the law. ie
thought no such power ought to exist. He was, at the same time, at a
loss what expedient to substitute. The justiciary of Arragon, he
observed, became by degrees the law giver.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS suggested the expedient of an
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absolute negative in the executive. He could not agree that the
judiciary, which was part of the executive, should be bound to say,
that a direct violation of the Constitution was law. A control over
the legislature might have its inconveniences; but view the danger on
the other side. The most virtuous citizens will often, as members of a
legislative body, concur in measures which afterwards, in their
private capacity, they will be ashamed of. Encroachments of the
popular branch of the government ought to be guarded against. V
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 429-30 [Madison's Diary] (1937).
Remarks by James Wilson in the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, speaking on December 7, 1787:
The article respecting the judicial department is objected to as
going too far, and is supposed to carry a very indefinite meaning.
Let us examine this: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in
law and equity. arising under this Constitution and the laws o the
United States.- Controversies may certainly arise under this
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and is it not proper
that there should be judges to decide them? The honorable gentleman
from Cumberland (Mr. Whitehill) says that laws may be made
inconsistent with the Constitution; and that therefore the powers
given to the judges are dangerous. For my part, Mr. President, I
think the contrary inference true. If a law should be made
inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument in Congress,
the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the particular
powers to government being defined, will declare such law to be
null and void: for the power of the Constitution predominates.
Anything, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary
thereto, will not have the force of law. I1 LlL.IOT'S DEBATES 489
(1937).
Letter by Luther Martin, delegate from Maryland to the
Philadelphia Convention, to Speaker of the House of Delegates of
Maryland, explaining sources of his dissatisfaction with the
proposed Constitution. The context is one of examining the weak
position of the states in the determination of the constitutionality of
Acts of Congress:
Whether, therfore. any laws or reguiation.% of the Congress. any
acts of it.% President or other officers, are contrary to. or not
warranted by, the Constitution, rests only with the judges. who are
appointed by Congress, to determine: by xhose determinations every
state must be bound. I 1.1,I.IOT'S DI-BATI's 344. 380 (1937).
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Antecedent Judicial Practice
Professor Sutherland (CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 236-39
(1965)) points out that constitutional review of federal statutes had
been exercised by the Supreme Court even prior to Marbury v.
Madison, and that Marbury was simply the first case in which a
statute had been voided, rather than upheld, in the course of such
review. In Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171 (1796), for instance,
an unapportioned tax on carriages was upheld against a complaint
that it was a "direct" tax and therefore unconstitutional because not
apportioned. Consideration of the argument on its merits implicitly
affirmed the Court's prerogative to refuse judicial enforcement of a
federal statute not authorized by the Constitution as interpreted by
the Court itself.
The same point is developed more elaborately by Professor
Mason (THE SUPREME COURT 73-76 (1962)) where he says, in part:
Before Marshall, the Court had not actually asserted the
authority to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. But it had
entertained that right in several important cases, including
Hayburn's Case (1792), Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795), and
Hylton v. United States (1796). In 1797 the Court set aside a
Virginia statute regulating the rights of British creditors as in
conflict with a federal treaty. 'It is, indeed, a general opinion,'
Justice Chase commented in Cooper v. Telfair, 'it is expressly
admitted by all this bar, and some of the Judges have, individually,
in the circuits, decided, that the Supreme Court can declare an Act
of Congress to be unconstitutional, and, therefore, invalid; but there is
no adjudication of the Suprenie Court itself upon the point.'
See also the chapter by- Professor Kernochan in DOWLING &
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 19-31
(1965), adding evidence of state court practice of constitutional
review of state legislation (the review being under written state
constitutions or'natural law) before 1789 as well as before 1803.
Is it truly important that the Court possess the power of
horizontal (or national) substantive constitutional review? Consider
this statement:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several States. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-
96 (1920).
(Vol. 1969: 1
MARBUR Y v. MADISON
Consider, too, that the denial of such power would still leave the
Court the more ordinary authority of judicial review to interpret
Acts of Congress involved in litigation. As to this, it has been said:
[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them. GRAY,
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1924) (Bishop Hoadly).
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